Abstract. Adding a Schnorr signature to ElGamal encryption is a popular proposal aiming at thwarting chosen-ciphertext attacks by rendering the scheme plaintext-aware. However, there is no known security proof for the resulting scheme, at least not in a weaker model than the one obtained by combining the Random Oracle Model (ROM) and the Generic Group Model (Schnorr and Jakobsson, ASIACRYPT 2000). In this paper, we propose a very simple modification to Schnorr-Signed ElGamal encryption such that the resulting scheme is semantically secure under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2-secure) in the ROM under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In fact, we even prove that our new scheme is plaintext-aware in the ROM as defined by Bellare et al. (CRYPTO '98). Interestingly, we also observe that Schnorr-Signed ElGamal is not plaintext-aware (again, for the definition of Bellare et al.) under the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. We show that our new scheme additionally achieves anonymity as well as robustness, a notion formalized by Abdalla et al. (TCC 2010) which captures the fact that it is hard to create a ciphertext that is valid under two different public keys. Finally, we study the hybrid variant of our new proposal, and show that it is IND-CCA2-secure in the ROM under the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption when used with a symmetric encryption scheme satisfying the weakest security notion, namely ciphertext indistinguishability under one-time attacks (IND-OTsecurity).
already proved fruitful for signature schemes [KW03, GJKW07] . In fact, our scheme can be seen as an optimized variant of TDH2 [SG02] . A comparison of CPS-EG with existing related schemes can be found in Table 1 .
We prove our scheme to be in a sense minimal relatively to plaintext awareness: removing any input to the random oracle when computing the challenge for the signature makes the scheme provably (under some computational assumption) not plaintext-aware. 8 In particular, we show that SchnorrSigned ElGamal encryption is not plaintext-aware as defined in [BDPR98] under the CDH assumption. We think that this observation might help explain why progress has remained elusive regarding IND-CCA2-security of this scheme.
We also analyze the hybrid version of our scheme, named HCPS-EG, and show that it is IND-CCA2-secure in the ROM under the CDH assumption. As the non-hybrid variant, the scheme is anonymous under CCA2-attacks (assuming the CDH problem is hard) and strongly robust (assuming a collision-resistant hash function). An interesting feature of this scheme is that it achieves IND-CCA2-security using the weakest form of security for the data encapsulation mechanism (DEM), namely ciphertext indistinguishability under one-time attacks (IND-OT-security) [CS03, HHK10] . In more concrete terms, the HCPS-EG scheme can be safely used with AES in counter mode. This is a property shared with other ElGamal variants, notably [Boy07, AKO09] . However for these two schemes, the decryption algorithm never rejects (they aim at compact ciphertexts), and hence they cannot be robust. A summary of results regarding HCPS-EG as well as a comparison with related schemes can be found in Table 1 . Fully detailed analysis is deferred to Appendix B. Related work. Abe [Abe02] studied generic ways to combine a hybrid encryption scheme and a signature scheme (which in particular applies to Hashed ElGamal and Schnorr signatures) to obtain an IND-CCA2 encryption scheme in the ROM where validity of a ciphertext can be publicly checked. Besides, a lot of efforts were devoted to variants of ElGamal encryption provably IND-CCA2-secure in the standard model. This started with the "double-base" variant by Damgård [Dam91] , which is IND-CCA1-secure under the non-standard Diffie Hellman Knowledge (DHK) assumption [BP04] . Later, Cramer and Shoup [CS98] proposed their famous cryptosystem provably IND-CCA2-secure under the DDH assumption, and formally introduced the notion of hybrid encryption [CS03] . Notable subsequent work includes [KD04, KPSY09] . Organization. In Section 2, we recall the necessary background on ElGamal encryption and plaintext awareness. We describe our new scheme and prove that it is plaintext-aware, hence IND-CCA2-secure in Section 3. Then, we show in Section 4 that our scheme is in a sense minimal if one wants to obtain plaintext awareness. In Section 5, we study anonymity and robustness of our new scheme.
Preliminaries

Basic Definitions
The security parameter will be denoted k. When S is a non-empty finite set, we write s ← $ S to mean that a value is sampled uniformly at random from S and assigned to s. By z ← A O 1 ,O 2 ,... (x, y, . . .) we denote the operation of running the (possibly probabilistic) algorithm A on inputs x, y, . . . with access to oracles O 1 , O 2 , . . . (possibly none), and letting z be the output. PPT will stand for probabilistic polynomial-time.
A (prime-order) group generator GpGen is a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter 1 k and outputs a triplet (G, p, G) where G is a group 9 of prime order p ∈ [2 k−1 , 2 k [ and G is a generator Table 1 . Comparison of variants of basic (non-hybrid) ElGamal encryption. The secret, resp. public key size is in number of mod p integers, resp. group elements. The next two columns give the number of exponentiations per encryption and decryption. For encryption, we separate off-line/online exponentiations. We count G s R −c as one single exponentiation even though it is slightly more expensive. The ciphertext size is given in number of group elements plus mod p integers. The IND column gives the assumption needed to prove IND-CCA2-security (all schemes except ElGamal use the ROM). The ANON+SROB column indicates whether the scheme achieves ANON-CCA2-security and strong robustness, as well as the assumptions needed. DDH stands for Decisional Diffie-Hellman, GGM for Generic Group Model, and CRHF for Collision-Resistant Hash Function. Regarding the security properties of TDH1/2, see Appendix C. 
of G. In all the following, we will assume that all algorithms are given (G, p, G) (e.g., as part of a public key) and will not denote it explicitly. We denote 1 G the identity element of G. We say that the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is hard relatively to GpGen if the following advantage:
is negligible for any PPT adversary A. We say that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard relatively to GpGen if the following advantage:
is negligible for any PPT adversary A. Random oracles are used for three distinct goals in the various schemes considered in this paper, and will be denoted as follows: H c will denote the random oracle used to generate the challenge for the signature, H K will denote the random oracle used to derive the key for the DEM in hybrid schemes, and H G will denote a random oracle mapping to G (only used in TDH1). We will use H as a shortcut for the set of random oracles accessed by a scheme.
Definition 1 (Encryption scheme).
A public key encryption scheme PKE is a triplet of polynomialtime algorithms (PKE.Kg, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) where: -PKE.Kg, the (probabilistic) key generation algorithm, takes a security parameter 1 k and returns a secret/public key pair (sk, pk). -PKE.Enc, the (probabilistic) encryption algorithm, takes a public key pk and a message M and returns a ciphertext ψ. -PKE.Dec, the (deterministic) decryption algorithm, takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext ψ and returns either a message M or the special symbol ⊥ that indicates that the ciphertext is invalid.
We assume that a public key pk defines a message space MsgSp(pk) and for consistency we impose that for any k:
We recall the usual security definitions for PKE schemes in Appendix A.
The ElGamal PKE encryption scheme is formally defined in Figure 1 (recall that the group parameters (G, p, G) are implicitly included in pk, and here MsgSp(pk) = G).
The following classical security result regarding ElGamal encryption is due to Tsiounis and Yung.
Theorem 1 ([TY98]). The ElGamal encryption scheme is IND-CPA-secure if and only if the DDH problem is hard relatively to GpGen.
Proof. We recall how to prove that hardness of DDH implies that ElGamal is IND-CPA-secure. Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an IND-CPA adversary against ElGamal. We build a reduction R solving the DDH problem. Let (G, p, G) ← GpGen(1 k ) and (X = G x , R = G r , R ) be the input to R. R runs A 1 with input pk = X, which outputs two plaintexts M 0 , M 1 . R draws b ← $ {0, 1}, and gives ψ * = (M b R , R) as the challenge ciphertext to A 2 . If A 2 outputs b = b, then R outputs 1, otherwise it outputs 0.
ElGamal PKE scheme Clearly, when (X, R, R ) is a DDH tuple, the IND-CPA security experiment is perfectly simulated by R, so that b = b with probability greater than 1/2 + Adv ind−cpa PKE,A (k). When (X, R, R ) is a random triplet then the view of A is independent of b and b = b with probability exactly 1/2. Hence Adv
GpGen,R (k) which concludes the proof.
Plaintext Awareness in the ROM
The notion of plaintext awareness was first suggested in [BR94] to capture the idea that the only way that an adversary can produce a valid ciphertext is to apply the encryption algorithm to the public key and a message. The motivation was that IND-CPA-security coupled with plaintext awareness should yield IND-CCA2-security, since this property would make the decryption oracle available to an IND-CCA2 adversary useless. The original definition in [BR94] , which was formalized in the ROM, was found too weak to imply IND-CCA2-security, and was later adequately refined in [BDPR98] . Providing a satisfactory definition for the standard model turned out to be more subtle and was achieved in [BP04] . Though it was initially thought as a simple tool geared towards proofs of IND-CCA2-security, intrinsic motivations for studying plaintext awareness were later proposed, in particular in order to securely instantiate the ideal encryption functions of the Dolev-Yao model [DY83, HLM03] , or to provide deniability to key exchange protocols [RGK06] .
In this work, we use the definition of plaintext awareness in the ROM introduced in [BDPR98] and we refer to this definition as ROM-PA-security. This definition involves two types of algorithms: a ciphertext creator C and a plaintext extractor P. The ciphertext creator is given a public key pk and has access to the random oracle H and to the encryption algorithm PKE.Enc H pk . All queries of C to the random oracle and corresponding answers are recorded in a list L H . All answers (ciphertexts) received from the encryption oracle are recorded in a list L ψ (the corresponding plaintexts are not recorded).
pk (pk). The plaintext extractor P takes as input (L H , L ψ , ψ, pk) and aims at returning the plaintext corresponding to ψ.
Definition 2 (ROM-PA).
Let PKE = (PKE.Kg, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) be an encryption scheme. PKE is said to be secure in the sense of plaintext awareness in the ROM (ROM-PA-secure) if there is a PPT algorithm P (the plaintext extractor) such that for any PPT ciphertext creator C, the failure probability of P relatively to C, defined as:
is a negligible function (the probability is taken over the random tape of all algorithms and the answers of the random oracle).
One may wonder why the ciphertext creator is given access to an encryption oracle since it can encrypt plaintexts by itself using the public key. However, this reflects the fact that an adversary may obtain ciphertexts it has not encrypted by itself (in particular, this is the case of the challenge ciphertext in an IND-CCA2 security experiment), in which case it may not necessarily know the corresponding random oracle queries (which are consequently not listed in L H ). See [Sho02, BDPR98] for a detailed discussion.
Bellare et al. [BDPR98] showed the following theorem. They also showed that ROM-PA-security is strictly stronger than IND-CCA2-security: there exist IND-CCA2-secure PKE schemes that are not ROM-PA-secure (provided IND-CCA2-secure PKE schemes exist at all).
Note that in the above definition of ROM-PA-security, the plaintext extractor is not given access to the random oracle: it must work with the list of random oracle queries of the ciphertext creator. If one allows the plaintext creator to freely access the random oracle, one loses the intuitively appealing constraint for the plaintext extractor to work given only the view of the ciphertext creator. However, for the results of Appendix B, we will need this relaxation of the definition, and will call ROM-PA'-security the resulting property. Fortunately, it can be checked that the proof of Theorem 2 can be straightforwardly transposed to ROM-PA'-security, namely IND-CPA-security plus ROM-PA'-security implies IND-CCA2-security.
Though the ElGamal encryption scheme does not use the ROM, it is clear that it cannot satisfy any notion of plaintext awareness since an adversary can simply output a random pair (Y, R) ← $ G 2 , which implies that a plaintext extractor should be able to break the one-wayness of the scheme, which holds under the CDH assumption. An attempt to make ElGamal encryption plaintext-aware is to add a Schnorr signature, resulting in what we call the Schnorr-Signed ElGamal (SS-EG) encryption scheme [TY98, Jak98] . Let H c : G 3 → Z p be a random oracle. It is defined in Figure 2 . As a warm-up for the proof of Theorem 4, we show below that this scheme inherits IND-CPAsecurity in the ROM under the DDH assumption from basic ElGamal encryption. 10 However, as discussed in the introduction, there is no known proof that this scheme is IND-CCA2-secure in a weaker model than the combination of the ROM and the GGM. In Section 4, we prove that this scheme is in fact provably not ROM-PA-secure under the CDH assumption. Proof. Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an IND-CPA adversary against SS-EG making at most q h random oracle queries. We proceed through a sequence of games as in [BR06] . Each game is a collection of the following procedures: -Init is called by the adversary at the beginning of the game; it runs the key generation algorithm and returns the public key; it also initializes a hashtable H for keeping track of the random oracle queries; -H c simulates the random oracle; -EncChal(M 0 , M 1 ) must be called once by the adversary, and returns the challenge ciphertext for the IND-CPA security experiment; -Finalize is called at the end of the game by the adversary when it outputs its guess b , and the output of this procedure is the output of the game Γ A .
SS-EG PKE scheme
When a game uses a flag Bad, it is always initialized to false. The games are defined in Table 3 . We start from game Γ 0 which is simply the IND-CPA security experiment defined in Appendix A. By definition:
In game Γ 1 , we introduce a flag Bad that may be set to true at line 13. We also move lines 15 and 17 up in the code. Since R is random and independent of values in hashtable H, one has Pr Γ 1 [Bad = true] ≤ q h /p. One can check that games Γ 0 and Γ 1 are identical until Bad is set to true, hence:
In game Γ 2 , we modify lines 8 to 11. It is easy to see that games Γ 1 and Γ 2 are identical. Namely, in game Γ 2 these lines are equivalent to the following instructions:
which makes it clear that (r, c, s, a, A) is identically distributed in both games. Hence:
In game Γ 3 , we simply change the way R is generated: it is now randomly drawn. Consider the following distinguisher B for the DDH problem. It is given a tuple (X, R, R ) as input, runs A, and simulates a game similar to games Γ 2 and Γ 3 where it uses X directly instead of line 4 of Init and R and R instead of lines 5 and 6 of EncChal. Clearly, when (X, R, R ) is a DDH tuple, game Γ 2 is perfectly simulated by B, whereas when (X, R, R ) is a random tuple, game Γ 3 is perfectly simulated. Hence: 
Game Γ1:
Game Γ2:
procedure EncChal(M0, M1):
Game Γ4:
Games Γ0 to Γ4:
Finally, in game Γ 4 , we replace lines 6 and 7 and simply draw Y at random. Clearly, games Γ 3 and Γ 4 are identical since R is never used later in the code of these games. Moreover, the view of A in game Γ 4 is independent of the bit b drawn by EncChal, hence:
Combining all of the above, we obtain:
This concludes the proof.
Chaum-Pedersen-Signed ElGamal Encryption
In this section, we describe our modification of the SS-EG encryption scheme and analyze its security. We name the new scheme Chaum-Pedersen-Signed ElGamal (CPS-EG for short) encryption. The change is quite small: we simply add two elements, R = R x and A = A x , in the inputs to the random oracle H c when computing the challenge c for the signature. This corresponds to moving from a proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm r = DLog G (R) to a Chaum-Pedersen [CP92] proof of equality of discrete logarithms DLog G (R) = DLog X (R ). The scheme uses a random oracle Figure 3 . Note that the signature added to the ciphertext is the pair (A, s) rather than (c, s) (i.e. the usual Fiat-Shamir signature consisting of the commitment and the response, rather than the optimized variant consisting of the challenge and the response), see Remark 1 below. Note that the correctness of a ciphertext cannot be checked publicly (i.e. without knowledge of the secret key x). As for the Schnorr-Signed variant, the scheme remains IND-CPA-secure under the DDH assumption for GpGen. Game Γ1:
CPS-EG PKE scheme
PKE.Kg(1 k ) (G, p, G) ← GpGen(1 k ) x ← $ Z * p ; X := G x sk := x; pk := X Return (sk, pk) PKE.Enc(pk = X, M ) r, a ← $ Z * p R := G r ; R := X r Y := M R A := G a ; A := X a c := Hc(Y, R, R , A, A ) s := a + cr mod p Return ψ := (Y, R, A, s) PKE.Dec(sk = x, ψ) Parse ψ as (Y, R, A, s) R := R x ; A := A x c := Hc(Y, R, R , A, A ) if G s = AR c or X s = A R c Return ⊥ Return M := Y /R
Theorem 4. Assume that the DDH problem is hard for GpGen. Then the CPS-EG encryption scheme is IND-CPA-secure in the ROM.
procedure Finalize(b ):
Game Γ2: 
Bad := true return b = b Games Γ0 to Γ4:
Proof. Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an IND-CPA adversary against CPS-EG making at most q h random oracle queries. We proceed through a sequence of games as in the proof of Theorem 3 (refer to this proof for notations). The games are defined in Table 4 .
We start from game Γ 0 which is simply the IND-CPA security experiment defined in Appendix A. By definition:
In game Γ 1 , we introduce a flag Bad that may be set to true at line 13 if H contains any entry ( * , * , * , * , A ) where * denotes any group element. We also move lines 15 and 17 up in the code. Since A is random and independent of values in hashtable H, one has Pr Γ 1 [Bad = true] ≤ q h /p. One can check that games Γ 0 and Γ 1 are identical until Bad is set to true, hence:
In game Γ 2 , s is now randomly drawn, and we don't program the random oracle anymore. Instead, we move lines 11, 12 and 13 of EncChal to procedure Finalize, i.e. we check during procedure Finalize whether there has been any query of the form ( * , * , * , * , A ) to the random oracle, where * denotes any group element. Consider the game Γ 1 which is identical to game Γ 1 except that the programming of the random oracle at line 16 is deferred to the (possible) point in the game where the adversary makes the query H c (Y, R, R , A, A ), at which point the flag Bad is also set to true.
Clearly this does not change the output distribution of the game and Pr[Γ
. Note that we can also set the flag Bad to true in game Γ 2 as soon as a query H c ( * , * , * , * , A ) occurs. It is now easy to see that games Γ 1 and Γ 2 are identical until Bad is set to true, since when Bad remains false in Γ 1 the view of the adversary is independent of c and hence s looks perfectly random as in Γ 2 . Hence:
We now upper bound the probability that Bad is set to true in Γ 2 . For this, we construct an algorithm B for the CDH problem as follows. B is given (X, A) where X = G x and A = G a as input. It runs A, and simulates game Γ 2 using X and A directly instead of lines 4 of procedure Init and line 8 of EncChal. When A finishes, B picks a random tuple ( * , * , * , * , Z) ∈ H that has been queried to the random oracle by the adversary A and outputs Z as its guess for G ax . Then, conditioned on Bad being true, B is successful with probability at least 1/q h , so that the success probability of this algorithm satisfies: Adv
GpGen,B (k) . In game Γ 3 , we simply change the way R is generated: it is now randomly drawn. Exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3, there is an algorithm B for the DDH problem such that:
Finally, in game Γ 4 , we replace lines 6 and 7 and simply draw Y at random. Clearly, games Γ 3 and Γ 4 are identical since R is never used later in the code of these games. Moreover, the view of A in game Γ 4 is independent of bit b, hence:
Combining all the above, we obtain:
This concludes the proof. The intuition regarding why the CPS-EG scheme is ROM-PA-secure is simple: since R is now included in the random oracle queries, the plaintext extractor will directly be able to decrypt Y once it has located the corresponding query. Namely i . The uniqueness of a query passing both checks is ensured by the following lemma (which is the core of the proof of soundness of the Chaum-Pedersen protocol [CP92] , and also the base of the "twinning" technique of Cash et al. [CKS08] ). Proof. Denote R = R y and A = A z , and assume that there exists (s 1 , c 1 ) and (s 2 , c 2 ) with c 1 = c 2 satisfying G s i = AR c i and
We now give the formal proof that the scheme is ROM-PA-secure. We now analyze the failure probability of the plaintext extractor. For this, we define a bad event as follows: event Bad happens if there exists some query (Y, R, , then the view of C and P is independent of the value of H c at this point. Thus, the ciphertext is valid with probability at most 1/p. Hence, by returning ⊥, the plaintext extractor errs with probability at most 1/p.
Case 2: There are two distinct queries (Y, R, R i , A, A i ) and (Y, R, R j , A, A j ) in L H which pass the checks. Then necessarily one of these two queries (say query i) is such that
But this implies that Bad has happened, so that this case occurs with probability less than q h /p. 
Case 3: There is a unique query (Y, R, R , A, A ) such that both checks pass. If R = R x and
which is negligible in the security parameter. The scheme is ROM-PA and it follows from Theorems 2 and 4 that the scheme is IND-CCA2-secure in the ROM under the assumption that DDH is hard for GpGen.
We note that CPS-EG seems to be the simplest IND-CCA2-secure scheme in the ROM that retains some kind of homomorphic property. Namely, given two ciphertexts (Y 0 , R 0 , A 0 , s 0 ) and (Y 1 , R 1 , A 1 , s 1 ) corresponding respectively to plaintexts M 0 and M 1 , one can compute the first two elements of the ciphertext for M 0 M 1 as for basic ElGamal encryption. It is however impossible to "sign" the new ciphertext without knowledge of the random values used to encrypt M 0 and M 1 . This property appears to be useful in e-voting applications [Wik08, BCP + 11].
Minimality of CPS-EG Regarding Plaintext Awareness
In this section, we consider whether the CPS-EG encryption scheme remains ROM-PA-secure when some inputs are removed from the call to the random oracle H c . We are able to show that under an adequate assumption, the resulting scheme cannot be ROM-PA-secure. Namely:
-If we remove R and A , we exactly recover the SS-EG scheme, and we can show that the scheme is not ROM-PA-secure under the CDH assumption. -If we remove one single element among R, R , A, or A , then the scheme is not ROM-PA-secure under the DDH assumption. Moreover, removing Y trivially makes the scheme malleable, while removing A yields a scheme which is not IND-CPA-secure. This is captured by the following two theorems.
Theorem 6. Assume that the CDH problem is hard for GpGen. Then the SS-EG encryption scheme is not ROM-PA-secure.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that SS-EG encryption is ROM-PA-secure, and let P be a plaintext extractor. Note that this extractor must work for any plaintext creator, in particular for the ciphertext creator C * working as follows: C * draws a random message M ← $ G, and encrypts it honestly. We now build a reduction R that solves the CDH problem. Let (G, p, G) ← GpGen(1 k ) and (X = G x , R = G r ) denote the input to R. R simulates the run of the ciphertext creator C * as follows. It draws two integers c, s , and pk = X. It is clear that this is a perfect simulation of a run of C * (in particular the ciphertext is valid, and that the simulation of the random oracle is perfect). Hence, with overwhelming probability, P returns the plaintext M corresponding to ψ, from which R can compute
Since ROM-PA-security is strictly stronger than IND-CCA2-security, the result above does not imply that SS-EG is not IND-CCA2-secure in the ROM. Would SS-EG be proved IND-CCA2-secure this would yield a natural separation between this notion and ROM-PA-security (the separation provided in [BDPR98] used a rather contrived counter-example, but without any computational assumption). Also, there are many possible ways to weaken the definition of plaintext awareness in the ROM. The theorem above seems to crucially rely on the impossibility for the plaintext extractor to rewind the ciphertext creator or to program the random oracle: it must work online, and can only observe the ciphertext creator queries. In particular, [BP04] proposed weaker notions of PA in the ROM where the plaintext extractor is not black-box (it can depend on the code of the ciphertext creator), and is given the random coins of the ciphertext creator, which enables to rewind it. Exploring whether SS-EG may fulfill such weaker definitions is an interesting open question.
Regarding the minimality of CPS-EG, we have the following result. We finally show (c). We focus on the case where R is omitted first, namely c is computed as c := H c (Y, R, A, A ) . Assume for contradiction that the resulting scheme is ROM-PA-secure, and let P be a plaintext extractor. Consider the two following ciphertext creators C * ddh and C * rand . C * ddh simply draws a random message M ← $ G and encrypts it honestly. C * rand on the other hand behaves as described in Table 5 . Note that the ciphertext created by C * rand is invalid with overwhelming probability. A, A ) is a DDH tuple, R perfectly simulates a run of C * ddh , whereas when (X, A, A ) is a random tuple, R perfectly simulates a run of C * rand . Since in both cases the extractor must return the correct answer with overwhelming probability, R solves the DDH problem with advantage close to 1.
Theorem 7. Consider the CPS-EG scheme where one of the five elements (Y, R, R , A, A ) is omitted from the inputs the H c when generating c. Then one has the following: (a) If Y is omitted, then the resulting scheme is malleable and hence is not IND-CCA2-secure. (b) If A is omitted, then the resulting scheme is not IND-CPA-secure. (c) If R, R , A or A is omitted, then assuming that DDH is hard for
The reasoning is similar for the cases where R, A, or A are omitted. For completeness, we describe the corresponding ciphertext creators C * rand in Table 6 .
Anonymity and Robustness of CPS-EG
The formal definition of anonymity for a PKE scheme is recalled in Appendix A. Informally, this requires that an adversary cannot distinguish under which public key an (adversarially chosen) message was encrypted. We start with showing that the CPS-EG scheme provides anonymity under CCA2 attacks. Proof. We first show ANON-CPA-security. Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an ANON-CPA adversary against CPS-EG making at most q h random oracle queries. We proceed through a sequence of games as in the proof of Theorem 4 (refer to this proof for notations). The games are defined in Table 7 . We start from game Γ 0 which is simply the ANON-CPA security experiment defined in Appendix A. By definition:
Theorem 8. Assume that the DDH problem is hard for GpGen. Then the CPS-EG encryption scheme is ANON-CCA2-secure.
The transitions from game to game are then exactly the same as in the proof of Theorem 4, and we refer to this proof for a detailed analysis. The only difference stands in the way the probability that Bad is set to true in game Γ 2 is bounded. For this, we construct an algorithm B for the CDH problem as follows. B is given (X, A) where X = G x and A = G a as input. It runs A, and simulates game Γ 2 by replacing lines 4 and 5 of Init as follows: it draws α 0 , α 1 ← $ Z * p , and computes X 0 = X α 0 and X 1 = X α 1 . It also uses its input A directly instead of line 8 of EncChal. When A finishes, B takes a random tuple ( * , * , * , * , Z) that has been queried to the random oracle by the adversary A and outputs Z 1/α b as its guess for G ax . Clearly, game Γ 2 is perfectly simulated by B. Then, conditioned on Bad being true, B is successful with probability at least 1/q h , so that the success probability of this algorithm satisfies: Adv
As in the proof of Theorem 4, we obtain:
For the proof of ANON-CCA2-security, we use a composition theorem relying on the plaintext awareness of the scheme. However, the definition of ROM-PA given in Section 2.2 is well-suited to be composed with IND-CPA-security and not with ANON-CPA-security. Hence, we have to slightly modify the definition of ROM-PA into a new notion that we name ROM-ANON-PA. The new definition involves a ciphertext creator C which is given two random public keys pk 0 and pk 1 . It has access to the random oracle H and to the two encryption oracles PKE.Enc H pk 0 and PKE.Enc H pk 1 . All queries of C to the random oracle and corresponding answers are recorded in a list L H . All answers Table 7 . Games used in the proof of Theorem 8. Differences from game to game are highlighted in gray. The symbol * denotes any group element. Game Γ1:
(ciphertexts) received from the two encryption oracles are recorded in a list L ψ (neither the corresponding plaintexts nor which oracle was queried are recorded). C outputs a ciphertext ψ / ∈ L ψ and
pk 0 ,pk 1 (pk 0 , pk 1 ). The plaintext extractor P takes as input (L H , L ψ , ψ, b, pk 0 , pk 1 ) and aims at returning the plaintext corresponding to ψ and secret key sk b . PKE is said to be ROM-ANON-PA-secure if there is a PPT algorithm P (the plaintext extractor) such that for any PPT ciphertext creator C, the failure probability of P relatively to C, defined as:
is a negligible function (the probability is taken over the random tape of all algorithms and the answers of the random oracle). One can then show that if a scheme is ANON-CPA-secure and ROM-ANON-PA secure, then it is ANON-CCA2-secure. We sketch the justification of this fact. Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an ANON-CCA2 adversary against a PKE scheme. We build an ANON-CPA adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) as follows. B 1 is given two public keys pk 0 and pk 1 , and runs A 1 with the same public keys. It simply relays the random oracle queries of A 1 to its own random oracle, updating a list L H of queries and corresponding answers for the plaintext extractor. When A 1 makes a decryption query for ψ and key b, B 1 runs the plaintext extractor P with input (L H , L ψ = ∅, ψ, b, pk 0 , pk 1 ) and returns the corresponding output as the answer to the decryption query of A 1 . When A 1 outputs a message M , B 1 outputs the same message M , and receives a challenge ψ * . In the second phase of the security experiment, B 2 runs A 2 on the same challenge ψ * . As in the first phase, it simply relays the random oracle queries of A 2 to its own random oracle, updating the list L H accordingly. When A 2 makes a decryption query for ψ and key b, B 2 runs the plaintext extractor P with input (L H , L ψ = (ψ * ), ψ, b, pk 0 , pk 1 ) and returns the corresponding output as the answer to the decryption query of A 2 . Finally, it returns the same output as A 2 . The analysis of the advantage of B can be adapted from the proof of Theorem 4.2 of [BDPR98] , and it can be shown to be negligibly close to the one of A.
Finally, it remains to show that CPS-EG indeed satisfies the ROM-ANON-PA notion. This can be done with exactly the same extractor as in the proof of Theorem 5 (one simply has to replace X by the public key X b = G x b corresponding to the bit b output by C). The analysis of the success probability must be slightly adapted as follows. Denote pk 0 = G x 0 and pk 1 = G x 1 the public keys given as input to C. Let ψ = (Y, R, A, s) be the challenge ciphertext output by C, and assume wlog that C asks for the decryption of this ciphertext under secret key sk 0 = x 0 (b = 0 in the output of C). The analysis of cases 2 and 3 is unchanged. For case 1, only the first sub-case (i.e. when there exists some ciphertext ψ = (Y, R, A, s ) ∈ L ψ with s = s) is slightly modified. If this ciphertext was returned in answer to some encryption query for pk 0 , then it is necessarily valid and hence the challenge ψ is invalid. If this ciphertext was returned in answer to some encryption query for pk 1 , then assuming wlog that x 0 = x 1 , the random oracle query to H c made while computing this ciphertext was (Y, R, R x 1 , A, A x 1 ). Hence the view of C and P is independent of the value of H c on input (Y, R, R x 0 , A, A x 0 ) so that the plaintext extractor errs by returning ⊥ with probability at most 1/p.
The definition of strong robustness is recalled in Appendix A. We will now see that the CPS-EG scheme achieves strong robustness, assuming the following very simple tweak to the scheme (in fact, the same was proposed for Cramer-Shoup encryption in [ABN10] ). We define the CPS-EG * scheme exactly as the CPS-EG scheme, with the additional check on decryption that R = 1 G (if the check fails, then the decryption algorithm returns ⊥).
Theorem 9. Assume H c is instantiated with a collision-resistant hash function family. Then the CPS-EG * encryption scheme is SROB-CCA-secure.
Proof. Assume there is an adversary A with non-negligible advantage in the SROB-CCA game. Let X 0 = G x 0 and X 1 = G x 1 (where x 0 = x 1 with high probability) be the two public keys for which the adversary must return a ciphertext that decrypts to a valid plaintext under both secret keys x 0 and x 1 (we can assume that the challenger knows these secret keys, so that it can correctly answer any decryption query made by the adversary). Let ψ = (Y, R, A, s) atk
with the restriction that A 2 cannot query O 2 on the challenge ciphertext ψ * . PKE is said IND-ATKsecure if the advantage Adv ind−atk PKE,A (k) is negligible for all PPT adversaries A.
A.2 ANON-ATK security for a PKE
Let PKE = (PKE.Kg, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) be an encryption scheme, and let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an adversary. For atk ∈ {cpa, cca1, cca2} we define the advantage of A in breaking the anonymity of PKE as:
PKE is said SROB-ATK-secure if the advantage Adv srob−atk PKE,A (k) is negligible for all PPT adversaries A.
A.4 Security notions for a DEM
Let DEM = (DEM.Enc, DEM.Dec) be a DEM, and let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an adversary. The advantage of A in breaking the ciphertext indistinguishability of DEM is:
where the experiment is defined as: where the experiment is defined as:
Return 1 
B Hybrid Variant of the Scheme
We recall the definition of a data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) introduced in [CS03] (we will not need the notion of key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) to describe the hybrid variant of CPS-EG since it does not exactly fit the KEM/DEM framework). such query, the extractor returns ⊥. If there is more than one such query, the extractor aborts. Otherwise, denoting (χ, R, R , A, A ) the unique query such that the check passed, P makes the query 11 K := H K (R, R ), and returns M = DEM.Dec(K, χ). The analysis of the failure probability of the plaintext extractor is exactly the same as for Theorem 5.
Note that the scheme cannot be proved ROM-PA-secure in general. Indeed, assure that DEM is simply a one-time-pad: DEM.Enc(K, M ) = K ⊕ M . Consider the following ciphertext creator C: it simply draws a random string χ, and generates a ciphertext ψ = (χ, R, c, s) by computing the signature "honestly" (i.e. by drawing random integers r, a, etc.). Since the ciphertext creator does not make the query H K (R, R ), the plaintext extractor cannot recover the corresponding message M = χ ⊕ H K (R, R ), unless it has free access to H K . However, this seems to be rather an artifact of the ROM than a real problem: if H K were replaced by a standard key derivation function, the problem would disappear.
Theorem 11. When DEM is IND-OT-secure and under the CDH assumption, the HCPS-EG encryption scheme is IND-CPA-secure (and hence also IND-CCA2-secure).
Proof. We use a sequence of games. Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an IND-CPA adversary against the encryption scheme making at most q h queries in total to H K and H c . We start from game Γ 0 which is simply the IND-CPA security experiment defined in Appendix A. Let S 0 be the event that b = b in game Γ 0 . By definition:
In game Γ 1 , we modify the way the challenge ciphertext ψ * = (χ * , R, c, s) is generated. When A 1 outputs the two messages M 0 and M 1 , they are forwarded to the challenger of an IND-OT experiment for DEM, which returns some DEM ciphertext χ * used to build ψ * . The remaining is unchanged compared with Γ 0 . Let S 1 denote the event that b = b in game Γ 1 . It is easy to see that combining A with the adequate parts of the IND-CPA security experiment against PKE yields an adversary A against IND-OT of DEM. Again, by definition:
Moreover, let Bad 1 denote the event that A 2 queries H K at (R, R ) in game Γ 1 . Again, it is easy to see that games Γ 0 and Γ 1 are identical until Bad 1 happens, so that: ANON-CCA2-security follows from a composition theorem similar to the one used for Theorem 8. Namely, one can define the notion of ROM-ANON-PA' security which is similar to the ROM-ANON-PA notion, except that the plaintext extractor is freely allowed to make additional calls to the random oracle. Again, the proof that the scheme satisfies this security notion is very similar to the proof of Theorem 10.
C Description of Other Related Schemes
We describe here the TDH1/2 encryption schemes, as well as the Twin ElGamal KEM. We stress that TDH1/2 were originally described in [SG02] as hybrid schemes. Here we describe the nonhybrid version. Whereas the hybrid variant of TDH1 is proved IND-CCA2-secure under the CDH assumption, this does not seem to be the case of the non-hybrid variant. Nevertheless, we provide a security proof under the DDH assumption for both schemes. Additionally, we show that TDH1 is not (weakly) robust and that TDH2 is not ANON-CPA-secure.
C.1 The TDH1 encryption scheme
The TDH1 requires an additional random oracle H G : G 3 → G. It is defined in Figure 5 .
(non-hybrid) TDH1 PKE scheme
The decryption queries (before or after that the adversary received the challenge ciphertext) are treated as follows. Assume the reduction receives a decryption query for a ciphertext Ψ = (Y, R,R, c, s). R first computes A = G s R −c as usual. If H G is undefined for input (Y, R, A), then R returns ⊥. Otherwise it retrieves the valueḠ = X t = H G (Y, R, A) (which was effectively set as a random power of X). It also computesĀ =Ḡ sR−c , and can check whether H c (Ḡ,R,Ā) = c. It returns ⊥ if this does not hold. Otherwise, it computes R =R 1/t and returns M = Y /R as the corresponding plaintext. One can verify that Lemma 1 implies that with overwhelming probability, DLog G (R) = DLogḠ(R), so thatR 1/t = X r with r = DLog G (R) and the ciphertext is correctly decrypted.
At some point, the adversary sends two messages M 0 and M 1 and waits for the encryption of M b , b = 0 or 1. The reduction then sets Y * = M b R * , with b ← $ {0, 1}. It also chooses random values s * , c * ← $ Z * p , and defines A * = G s * (R * ) −c * . With overwhelming probability, the query to H G for the input (Y * , R * , A * ) has not been made yet by the adversary. R sets H G (Y * , R * , A * ) = X t * for some random t * . Then it derivesR * = (R * ) t * ,Ā * = (Ḡ * ) s * (R * ) −c * and sets H c (Ḡ * ,R * ,Ā * ) = c * (again, with overwhelming probability the adversary did not make the query to H c for the input (Ḡ * ,R * ,Ā * )). It returns Ψ * = (Y * , R * ,R * , s * , c * ) as the challenge ciphertext. Note that when (X, R * , R * ) is a DDH tuple, the encryption of M b is correctly computed, whereas when (X, R * , R * ) is a random tuple, Ψ * is valid with only negligible probability.
Finally, the adversary will output its guess for b. If the guess is right, the reduction outputs 1. Otherwise it output 0.
Clearly, when (X, R * , R * ) is a DDH tuple, the IND-CPA security experiment is perfectly simulated by R (up to decryption errors which happen only with negligible probability), so that b = b with probability greater than 1/2 + Adv ind−cpa PKE,A (k). When (X, R * , R * ) is a random tuple, we would like to argue that the view of A is independent of b. However, this holds only if A 2 never asks decryption queries Ψ = (Y, R,R, c, s) such that (Y, R, A = G s R −c ) = (Y * , R * , A * ). We argue now that this can only happen with negligible probability. Assume the contrary, and consider first the case that (c, s) = (s * , c * ). Then A = A * = G s (R * ) −c = G s * (R * ) −c * , which enables the reduction to compute DLog G (R * ) and correctly answer the DDH problem. Hence, we may assume that (c, s) = (s * , c * ), so that necessarilyR =R * . This implies however that H c (Ḡ,R,Ā) = H c (Ḡ,R * ,Ā * ) = c, in other words this yields a collision for H c , which can happen only with negligible probability. Hence when (X, R * , R * ) is a random tuple, R outputs 1 with probability negligibly close to 1/2, which concludes the proof.
We conjecture that the TDH1 encryption scheme is ANON-CCA2-secure under the DDH assumption. However, as it is rather a simple observation (captured by the following proposition) that it is not robust, we do not pursue it further.
Proposition 2. The TDH1 encryption scheme is not (even weakly) robust.
Proof. The key point is that the validity check is independent of the secret and the public key, so that when a ciphertext ψ = (Y, R,R, c, s) is (honestly) created with respect to some public key, then the validity check passes for any other secret key and the ciphertext decrypts to some valid plaintext under any secret key. Hence the scheme cannot be even weakly robust.
C.2 The TDH2 encryption scheme
The TDH2 scheme is similar to TDH1, except that the elementḠ is fixed and included in the public key. It is defined in Figure 6 .
